The strategic use of metaphors by political and media elites: the 2007-11 Belgian constitutional crisis by Cammaerts, Bart
  
Bart Cammaerts 
The strategic use of metaphors by political 
and media elites: the 2007-11 Belgian 
constitutional crisis 
 






Cammaerts, Bart (2012) The strategic use of metaphors by political and media elites: the 2007-
11 Belgian constitutional crisis. International journal of media & cultural politics, 8 (2/3). pp. 229-
249. 
DOI: 10.1386/macp.8.2-3.229_1  
 
© 2012 Intellect Ltd. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/45008/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: April 2013 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 




– 1 – 
The strategic use of metaphors by political and 
media elites: the 2007-2011 Belgian 
constitutional crisis 
 
one ought to recognize that the present political chaos is connected with the decay of 
language, and that one can probably bring about some improvement by starting at the verbal 
end. 
(George Orwell, from Politics and the English Language, quoted in Zashin and Chapman, 
1974: 290) 
 
Bart Cammaerts,  




On 9 December 2011 a new Belgian government was sworn in after a record 
breaking 541 days of negotiations between all democratic political forces with 
the aim to alter the constitution and provide more autonomy to the different 
regions that make up Belgium. In this article, the frequent use of political 
metaphors by North-Belgian politicians and journalists is analysed through a 
critical metaphor analysis which approaches the different metaphors at a 
descriptive, an interpretative and a motivational level. Four meta-categories of 
metaphors were identified - sports and games metaphors, war metaphors, 
culinary metaphors and transport metaphors. The different metaphors fed 
into six core-frames: expressing immobility, attributing blame, the need for 
unity, bargaining and teasing, the end is nigh and finally lack of direction and 
leadership. Metaphors were instrumental in strategies to present the Flemish 
demands as unquestionable and common sense, while the counter-demands 
of the French-speaking parties were positioned as unreasonable, impossible to 
accept. In other words, the strategic use of metaphors, some of which 
resonated throughout the long period of analysis, not only served to represent 
complex political issues in an easily digestible language, they also shaped and 
influenced the negotiations through their various mediations and the 
ideological intentions embedded within the metaphor. 
 
Keywords: 
Metaphors, Political Communication, Nationalism, Othering, Discourse, 
Belgium. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Politics without metaphors is like a ‘fish without water’, Thompson (1996) 
asserts. This provocative claim builds on a longstanding fascination of 
cognitive psychologists, linguists, political scientists and media scholars alike 
with political symbolism and discourse as strategies to construct meaning, to 
deceive citizens or to simplify politics (Ditmer 1977; Miller 1979; Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980; Chilton, 1985; Mio 1997; Goatly, 1997; Charteris-Black 
2004/2005; Carver and Pikalo 2007; Semino, 2008).  
 
Contrary to an Aristotelian referential view characterised by similarity and 
resemblance, a Nietzschean tradition not only approaches metaphors as 
strategies to make sense of the world, but to shape it as well (see Kofman 
1972; Cantor 1982), The metaphor represents a potent rhetorical tool for all 
political actors to shape the political minds of citizens (Lakoff, 2008), but also 
I would argue to communicate with their opponents through the media. It is 
thus not surprising, as Beer and de Landtsheer (2004: 24) note, that 
politicians make frequent use of metaphors  
 
as tools of persuasive communication, to bridge gaps and build identification 
between strangers; to frame issues; to create, maintain, or dissolve political 
coalitions; to generate votes and win elections. 
 
Through a critical metaphor analysis of metaphors produced by Dutch-
speaking Belgian political elites – politicians and journalists – through media 
discourses during the 2007-2011 period of political instability and 
constitutional crisis in Belgium, the hidden meanings of the used metaphors 
will be made explicit. This profound and existential political crisis for the 
Belgian Federal state constituted a highly productive context for the 
emergence of metaphors in the political discourse and communication of 
mainly the Dutch-speaking politicians and political journalists.  
 
First, the complex Belgian political context will be outlined, after which the 
use of metaphors in political communication will be theorised.  
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2. The Political and Socio-Cultural Context of Belgium 
 
The crisis under consideration here extends over a rather long period of time 
(almost 5 years) and was the result of a complete political gridlock between 
Dutch and French speaking political elites; between the aspirations of the 
North for further regionalisation of competencies, their desire to protect 
Dutch speaking communities around Brussels and the contrasting demands 
from French speaking parties to expand bi-lingual Brussels and consolidate 
the national Federal level. This socio-cultural, as well as linguistic, conflict has 
a long and complicated history and should also be seen in the context of a past 
in which a French-speaking economic and political elite dominated a Dutch-
speaking majority for a long time (see Witte, et al., 2009). As Blommaert 
(1996: 237) explains, from the very beginning in the 19th Century, Flemish 
nationalism was ‘aimed primarily against the absence of respect and 
recognition for the language of the Flemish people [Dutch] among the Belgian 
(Francophone) establishment’. 
 
The political crisis was further complicated and exacerbated by mutually 
beneficial political alliances between mainstream parties and radical forces on 
both sides of the language border. In the North, the Flemish nationalist party 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) was locked in a political cartel with the 
Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams (CD&V) party, while the Front des 
Francophone (FDF), advocating the interests of French speaking minorities 
around Brussels, joined the rightwing liberal party Movement Reformateur 
(MR) in the South and Brussels. Also within the Francophone and Flemish 
socialist parties we can observe a considerable proportion of regionalistes. All 
this led to highly contentious negotiations to form a government after the 
2007 elections, which were won convincingly by the cartel between CD&V and 
the Flemish nationalists N-VA.  
 
Attempts to forge a constitutional deal after the 2007 election were, however, 
doomed to fail and a government de raison was formed in view of dealing with 
the near-collapse of the global financial system in 2008. This subsequently 
resulted in the breakdown of the political cartel between and Christian-
democrats and Flemish nationalists. The national elections of June 2010 
resulted in an even more polarised political landscape as the N-VA, now 
running on its own, became the biggest party in the North and nationally, 
while the Parti Socialiste (PS) won the elections in the South. After a year of 
negotiating about the negotiation, the Flemish nationalists decided to leave 
the talks to form a new government. This meant that all other political 
democratic parties, excluding the neo-fascist Vlaams Belang, were required to 
alter the constitution. At some point, as has always been the case, a 
constitutional deal was struck and it was not pretty nor did it satisfy everyone, 
but on 6 December 2011, after a whopping 541 days without a government, the 
French-speaking socialist Elio Di Rupo was finally sworn in as the new prime 
minister of Belgium leading a grand coalition of socialists, Christian 
democrats and liberals. 
 
As already hinted at, the current Belgian state is very much the product of 
subsequent ceasefires in an ongoing conflict between centrifugal and 
centripetal forces within the Belgian Federal constellation (Witte, 1992; 
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Hooghe 1993; Deschouwer 2006)1. Without addressing the distinct 
technicalities of each of these (partial) settlements, their common feature was 
an incremental shift of ever more competencies from the national level of 
governance towards the regions, typically a Flemish demand and more 
financial resources for the South and for Brussels as compensations to woe the 
French speaking political elite into going along with Flemish aspirations for 
more autonomy. Problematic in this regard is that this has resulted in a 
political system whereby ‘all parties in Belgium only speak to the voters 
belonging to their own segment’ (Deschouwer 2006: 909), 
 
Belgium is therefore often described as a multi national state whereby the sub-
state entities, such as Flanders and Wallonia, are considered ‘nested 
nationalities’ since they are to some extent bounded both geographically and 
linguistically and at the same time embedded in a larger Federalized state 
(Miller, 2001). Nationalist forces in the North of the country have traditionally 
been at the forefront of a push for institutional change, but also in the South 
regionalist tendencies exist. Billig (1995: 61) asserts that ‘[n]ationalist 
thinking involves more than commitment to a group and a sense of difference 
from other groups. It conceives our group in a particular way’. His notion of 
banal nationalism points to how routine and familiar usage of language 
through political discourse, but also through cultural products, continuously 
flags or reminds us in a concealed way of ‘nationhood’. Flemish nationalism is 
no different in this regard as it constructs a rigid and pure identity of the sub-
state – Flanders – and the (white) citizens living in it – the Flemings. This 
effort is ridden with ‘issues of identity, customs and traditions’ and attempts 
to restore a mythical ‘past greatness’ and a pure and homogenous Flemish 
identity (Blommaert 1996: 253). 
 
Essentialist discourses of ‘the Other’, as well as of ‘the Self’ are rife in the 
distinct Dutch and French speaking public spaces. For example, in the South, 
Flemings are often depicted as intolerant racists or even worse as fascists, 
while in the North the stereotype of Walloons profiteering from the social 
security system is predominant. Such views are not only latently widespread 
among the subsequent populations, but are at the same time kept alive by 
political elites and the media, increasingly feeding a divisive process of 
Othering, serving to ‘externalise distance and exclude the other’ (Pickering 
2001: 47), As a result of this, Erk (2003: 203) claims that ‘[t]he linguistic 
divisions in Belgium in fact demarcate the borders between two separate 
demoi, i.e. two political communities which function as the default base for 
democratic politics’. 
 
Apart from surrealism, football/cycling, Belgian beer, chocolate and the royal 
family, there is little sense of belonging in terms of a Belgian identity, which 
has led to what Bailly and Sephiha (2005) have called ‘cloisonnement 
identitaire’ or identity closure between the different communities. As implied 
earlier, language is an important cleavage in Belgian politics and the different 
media thus only serve one community in one language. This has led to very 
separate media landscapes, with two independent public broadcasters, 
distinct commercial broadcasters, different newspapers, and very different 
ownership structures as well as regulatory regimes. Dewachter (1998: 185 – 
my translation) even asserts that ’[w]hen it concerns media, it is obvious that 
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the Belgian society does not exist anymore’. This also explains why it is often 
claimed that the media on both sides strengthen and amplify divisive 
constructions rather than enhancing national cohesion2. 
 
Figure 1: Two internet-pranks relating to the Belgian political crisis  
  
Source: a blog of a French-speaking 
journalist of the Dutch-speaking public 




Source: published in several 
newpapers, but first 
distributed virally through 
email and blogs. 
 
It is in this context that the profusion of metaphors in political 
communication should be understood and positioned. This requires us to 
analyse these metaphors in terms of their precise ideological intention and 
political aims. First, however, metaphors and their political use will be 
theorised. 
 
3. Metaphors and political communication 
 
A metaphor is described as linguistic cross-fertilisation, whereby ‘the word 
that is used for one thing is applied to something else’ (Miller 1979: 156), 
which results in what Aristotle called the transference of meaning from the 
source domain (SD) to the target domain (TD), An often-heard claim is that 
the extensive use of metaphors in political communication can be attributed to 
attempts of political leaders and elites to make politics less abstract and more 
tangible for citizens or to voters. Ditmer (1977: 567) argues in this regard that:  
 
The selection of a word from everyday language endows the symbol with an 
appearance of familiarity, enabling members of the mass public to relate on 
a more intimate level to a remote, complex and seemingly irrelevant event.  
 
Along the same lines Schmitt (2005: 336) points out that ‘[m]etaphors 
provide schemes, which bundle together the fullness of details, making them 
clearer and more manageable’. 
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However, the simplification of complex political issues to an assumed largely 
ignorant public is by no means the only or arguably most important reason for 
the extensive use of metaphors in political communication. Metaphors are not 
merely descriptive by depicting for us in a straightforward way ‘what is’. The 
use of a metaphors and selection of the metaphor often has a precise political 
aim; either to promote one view against another or to discredit or humiliate 
political adversaries or enemies. In this regard, Vavrus (2000: 194) rightly 
points out that ‘[f]ar from simply describing the world, metaphors are 
prescriptive linguistic devices that guide and shape thinking as well’. This 
concurs with a post-structuralist disposition whereby the ‘[m]etaphor is less in 
the philosophical text ... than the philosophical text is within metaphor’ 
(Derrida 1982: 258),  
 
At the same time this also brings political intention into play or the pragmatics 
of using metaphors. Intention is intrinsically linked to the choice of metaphors 
to describe a particular event, phenomenon or situation. Jamieson (1985: 49) 
defines intentionality as: 
 
a kind of focusing device in the imaginative consciousness; it concentrates 
and thus it excludes; it is a selective device, selecting an image to be raised 
into consciousness from a range of alternatives. Without intention, nothing 
has prominence, therefore one has to intend when one imagines. 
 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) were instrumental in the shift from seeing 
metaphors as reflective to considering them more as constitutive by 
introducing a cognitive linguistics perspective. They contend that metaphors 
are discursive instruments for the construction of certain views, ideas, and 
ways of seeing the world, thereby ‘creat[ing] social reality and guid[ing] social 
action’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 156). This is consistent with a Lacanian 
view that approaches metaphors as ‘creative sparks’ that produce meaning 
and ultimately construct ideology (Lacan, 1997: 157). Lakoff and Johnson also 
react against the down-playing of the cognitive in some post-structuralist 
accounts of discourse and power. Arguing against Foucault, Balkin (1998: 
272) defends that discursive ‘power arises out of cognitive mechanisms as well 
as out of technology and social practices’.  
 
The power of the metaphor thus lies foremost in its subliminal character, in its 
ability to express apparent taken-for-grantedness and common sense. From a 
cognitive psychology background, Moi (1997: 130) asserts that metaphors are 
effective instruments in political communication because they ‘resonate with 
latent symbolic representations residing at the unconscious level’. Grey 
(2000) concurs with this and explains that ‘[e]veryday metaphors are invisible 
because we understand them immediately, and therefore have no need to pay 
attention to their metaphorical character’.   
 
Framing theory is also useful in this regard as frames offer ‘schemata of 
interpretation’ (Goffman, 1974) to make sense of the world. From a critical 
framing perspective, the political use of metaphors can be seen as part of 
‘framing wars’– a conflict between competing and conflicting meanings and 
interlinked with the construction of us/them dichotomies by attributing 
characteristics such as good and evil, just and unjust to the different subject-
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positions. In relation to metaphors, Musolff (2004) speaks of a process of 
‘metaphor negotiation’ in this regard. 
 
The metaphor thus enables political actors to convey certain easily digestible 
images and ideas, while at the same time framing the way citizens perceive a 
certain issue. In a study of metaphors in popular literature, Van Teeffelen 
(1994: 384–386) concludes that the strength of the metaphor in terms of 
political communication consists in its ability 
 
to emphasize particular elements and linkages, and simultaneously to de-
emphasize others. Since they organize the understanding of cause and 
effect, symptom and essence, and especially praise and blame, metaphors 
can be employed to serve political aims or interests. When thus used as 
ideological devices, they privilege, and when turning into common sense, 
naturalize particular accounts of reality. 
 
This is very reminiscent of how Gramsci (1971) conceived cultural hegemony. 
The strategic use of metaphors in the political communication strategies of 
political and media elites thus clearly constitutes a powerful discursive 
practice with the intent to hegemonize certain views, ideas and ideologies to 
the detriment of others and to temporarily fix meaning (Lakoff, 2008). 
Temporarily, as hegemony is never absolute nor inherently stable; it ‘has to be 
fought for constantly in order to maintain it’ (Giroux, 1981: 17).  
 
As a consequence, each political actor can potentially challenge so-called 
common sense and develop counter-hegemonic long term strategies, which 
thus becomes part of a ‘war of position’ (Gramsci 1971: 239) aiming to 
hegemonize the counter-hegemony. From the perspective of political 
communication, metaphors can thus be approached as discursive weapons in 
a war of position between often divergent and conflictual conceptions of the 
organisation of society, of the role and nature of the state, and in relation to 
identities and citizenship. 
 
In order to study the use of metaphors in political communication strategies, 
critical metaphor analysis (CMA), a form of critical discourse analysis (CDA), 
has been applied (see Maalej 2006). CDA is ‘concerned with opaque as well as 
transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and 
control as manifested in language’ (Wodak 2001: 2). It addresses the way 
language and discourse are part of an ideological process embedded in history 
and culture. Furthermore, it considers discourse and political rhetoric 
constitutive of ‘social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge or 
beliefs’ and aims to expose ‘how these discourses maintain power through 
their ideological properties’ (Brooks 1995: 462), 
 
CMA, introduced by Charteris-Black (2004), draws upon CDA, but also on 
pragmatics and on the cognitive approach developed by Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980). By doing so CMA seeks to combine different strands in CDA, enabling 
to address the cognitive, the ideological as well as the historical attributes of 
metaphors, thereby closing the conceptual gap between Foucauldian post-
structuralism and cognitive approaches. Partly following Fairclough (1989), 
Charteris-Black (2004) and Maalej (2007), but also using critical frame 
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analysis the metaphors being used during the Belgian political crisis of 2007-
2008 will be addressed on three different levels of analysis: 
 
1. Descriptive level: identification and recognition, frames being 
addressed 
2. Interpretative level: mapping out correspondences between frames 
3. Motivational level: identifying political intentions 
 
At the first level of analysis of the metaphors, broad meta-categories providing 
identification will be determined. Besides this, the different frames to which 
the metaphors speak will be identified. At the second level of analysis, 
correspondences between the source domain and the target domain will be 
mapped out. At the explanatory level of analysis the question as to why certain 
metaphors were chosen will be addressed, exposing the political, pragmatic 
and strategic intentions they reveal. 
 
4. Metaphors as mediated discursive strategies during 
the 2007-11 Belgian political crisis 
 
As Bruck (1992: 108) succinctly points out, ‘[c]rises are not real events’, but 
rather ‘evaluations of the significance of what is happening’. He views crises as 
media spectacles whereby certain views and elites are given preferential status 
above others. The specific focus on media and metaphors is therefore 
regarded as a relevant site of research as ‘the nature of the power relations in 
[mass-media discourse] is often not clear, and there are reasons for seeing it 
as involving hidden relations of power’ (Fairclough 1989: 49 – emphasis in 
original). It is in the media and through the media that metaphors are 
produced and disseminated. Furthermore, it is argued that these mediated 
metaphors conform to particular frames which are privileged over and above 
other frames thereby shaping our understanding of politics. As Gitlin (1980: 
7) points out, the media provides ‘persistent patterns of cognition, 
interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by 
which symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse, whether verbal or 
visual’. 
 
The metaphors being analysed in this article are thus mediated metaphors 
used in public discourse by both political elites and political journalists. Those 
that are being targeted by the metaphors varies; while political journalists 
tend to use metaphors to make a complex political process more palatable for 
their audiences or to voice their critique on the process, political elites use 
them both to speak to the electorate, as well as to their political opponents in 
the negotiating process.  
 
Most mediated political metaphors emerging out of this analysis conform to 
the analogous type of metaphors – ‘seek[ing] to put the objects of base in a 
one-to-one correspondence with the objects of the target so as to obtain 
maximum structural match’ (Gentner 1988: 48). Others, however, cannot be 
fully understood without the socio-political context within which they are 
produced and fulfil criteria of (local) recognition and identification (Charteris-
Black 2004: 35).  
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4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
The corpus on which this analysis is based consisted of the archives of the 
Dutch speaking broadsheet newspapers and the archive of the public 
broadcaster VRT. These were searched in view of mapping out the different 
metaphors used by political elites. This resulted in the identification of four 
consistent meta-categories or clusters of political metaphors frequently used 
during the crisis3: 
 
1. Sports- and Games metaphors 
2. War metaphors 
3. Culinary metaphors 
4. Transport related metaphors 
 
Within each of these categories different frames were addressed, as will be 
outlined below. When selecting metaphors for analysis, particular attention 
was paid to the manifest inter-textualities between different metaphors, the 
frequency of their use, their sustainment in the public discourse over time and 
their proprieties to be part of a meta-narrative or an ‘order of discourse’ 
(Fairclough 1992; Foucault 1981) pertinent to the particular context of the 
case.  
 
Frame 1: Expressing Political Immobility  
 
The first frame, which aligns with the sports and games metaphors and 
characterises the early stages of the crisis, could be called ‘expressing political 
immobility’. In view of increasing recognition and resonance, sport metaphors 
used by political elites are usually embedded in the local sports culture  
 
Football is one of the most popular sports in Belgium and lends itself well to 
metaphorical use. For example, Ivan De Vadder, one of the most prominent 
political journalists, compared the political crisis to football on his blog: 
‘After eight months of tackling and sliding, the ground is scattered with 
knackered players’, he wrote, but the game is by no means over yet, as ‘the 
players will have to dig deep into their reserves for extra time’ (De Vadder 
2008 – my translation). More recently, referring to the negotiations after the 
June 2010 elections, one of his colleagues tweeted: ‘The Palace has allowed 
Reynders [yet another negotiator appointed by the King] to play extra time. 
No goal has been scored yet. Where are the fans?’4 (Van de Looverbosch, 
15/02/2011 – my translation). 
 
The difficulties of the negotiation process were also symbolised in the frequent 
use of the cycling-metaphor ‘surplacen’ (Rogiers 2007a). Surplacen can be 
traced back to the track cycling velodrome and signifies almost standing still 
before starting a sprint while cyclists lure at each other’s wheel to see who sets 
off first. In the weekly magazine De Tijd (2007: 31) it read: ‘Despite the will of 
Leterme [the Prime Minister] to move on, all protagonists kept surplacen’. In 
subsequent years as a settlement remained elusive, the resonance and 
persistence of this metaphor in public discourse strengthened as even political 
scientists began using it; Pascal Delwit spoke of the ‘world record surplacen’ 
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(Delwit 2011) and his colleague Carl Devos (2011) wrote about ‘surplacen for 
the advanced’: 
 
‘Surplacen is a somewhat silly position that is taken momentarily before the 
sprint starts, before an explosion of power and desire. What we need after all 
these months is courage. Courage to go somewhere.’  
 
In this regard, the chess metaphor ‘stalemate’ was also used at times, which 
denotes a gridlock, a game without winners.  
 
Frame 2: Blaming the other 
 
In such conflictual political circumstances, the key strategy often consists in 
blaming others for the failure to reach an agreement, as is exposed in the 
emergence of the game metaphor ‘passing on the black jack’ (De Morgen 
2007a). This strategy consisted in either blaming the other for being unwilling 
to compromise or condemning negotiating partners for their readiness to 
concede too much. 
 
While Bart De Wever, the president of the Flemish nationalist party N-VA, 
declared that he ‘does not want to pass the black jack to anyone’, as the 
‘responsibility for the failure of forming a government lies with all parties 
around the negotiating table’ (quoted in Gazet Van Antwerpen, 2010a), it 
should be clear that the attribution of guilt is a political strategy of prime 
importance for the nationalists as well as for other parties. A journalist of a 
North-Belgian weekly magazine observed that ‘the main worry of all parties is 
to receive the black jack if and when the negotiations fail’ (Martens 2010).  
 
In the mean time, it also became clear that these political games of blaming 
‘the other’ not only tainted the trust in politics in general even further, but as 
journalist Ivan de Vadder (2010) pointed out, ‘the game of ‘passing on the 
black jack also undermines the trust between politicians’, essential to reach a 
negotiated political deal. 
 
Frame 3: United We Stand 
 
The third frame coincides with the introduction of war metaphors and 
resonates with the frame: ‘united we stand’. The notion of a ‘front’ is 
undoubtedly a very important and persistent war metaphor in the Belgian 
political context. The need for a front is perceived to be high as this quote 
from an editorial exposes: ‘For the first time in six months there was a 
Flemish Front. And look: it works’ (Gazet Van Antwerpen 2010b). In its pure 
form, the Flemish front needs to remain united and does not retreat on its 
collective demands whilst the French-speaking front is forced to keep saying 
no and positioned as unwilling to concede to the legitimate and reasonable 
Flemish demands.  
 
Another commonly used war metaphor in the Belgian context goes back to the 
First World War, namely ‘the trenches’. This concurs to some extent with 
the sport metaphor of ‘surplacen’, as it refers to the different political actors 
being on the defensive, digging in, not taking too many risks, but above all it 
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denotes an unwillingness to compromise, while at the same time waging a 
full-scale political war of position which requires a united front against the 
enemy. A statement by the Flemish nationalist party leader Bart De Wever 
read; ‘we will have to see whether they leave the trenches and are genuinely 
ready to engage in negotiations that could lead to a solution’ (quoted in De 
Morgen 2007b – my translation and emphasis added). Other politicians, such 
as the former liberal Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, called upon all parties 
to ‘leave the trenches in which we have dug ourselves, out of the deep mud of 
Belgian politics’. (quoted in VRT 2008 – my translation), 
 
In an editorial, Yves Desmet (2007 – my translation), the then editor-in-chief 
of the centre-left newspaper De Morgen, warned about the detrimental effects 
of these war metaphors in political discourse:  
 
A Flemish front and placing a bomb under the negotiations, unacceptable 
and a slap in the face; the readiness to talk has seldom be this far away. 
Why have the key values of our democracy – dialogue, respect and 
compromise – suddenly been devalued to ultimate proofs of weaknesses? 
 
Frame 4: Bargaining and Teasing 
 
Regarding the frame ‘bargaining and teasing’, culinary metaphors were often 
used. Guy Verhofstadt noted ‘a new trend: that of a metaphor politics, with 
declarations about nibbles and fat fish’ (quoted in De Morgen 2008 – my 
translation). In doing so, he referred to two of the most persuasive food 
metaphors used by Flemish politicians during the crisis. The first one – 
nibbles – denotes small concessions that were being asked for by the Flemish 
negotiators, as a kind of foreplay to solving the big institutional issues. The 
second culinary metaphor – a fat fish in the frying pan – was frequently 
used by Flemish nationalists to indicate that they demanded a substantial 
institutional reform and not some tiny cosmetic changes. The fat fish 
metaphor persisted in political discourse over time. At some point in the 
negotiating process it was suggested to address one issue thoroughly, enabling 
the Flemish to claim their fat fish, while leaving other matters for the next 
elections. However, the French-speaking parties felt that there were already 
enough ‘fat fishes lying on the negotiating table’ (VRT, 2010) and deemed that 
the Flemish negotiators were too greedy. 
 
Culinary metaphors were also used to adopt a more conciliatory tone in the 
negotiation process, indicating a willingness to bargain, but from a position of 
superiority. De Wever, very prolific in the production of metaphors, wanted to 
convey at some point in the negotiation process that his party was ready to 
compromise by saying that he was prepared to offer a ‘tea spoon of sugar’ 
to the Francophones (De Morgen 2007d). This metaphor was subsequently 
widely adopted by the media and other political actors, being very pervasive in 
political discourse for several months. This frame is, however, not only about 
bargaining in a negotiation process, the tone and selection of metaphors also 
hints at a sense of entitlement and disdain versus the adversary, hence the 
addition of teasing to this frame.  
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Frame 5: The End Might Be Nigh 
 
Another fairly frequently used culinary metaphor during the crisis partly 
related to the frame ‘the end might be nigh’. Several political actors used a 
mayonnaise metaphor to indicate that a compromise was in the making or 
the exact opposite. The Flemish nationalist Bart De Wever at some point 
stated ‘I never had the feeling that the mayonnaise was coalescing’ (quoted in 
De Morgen 2007e – my translation). The interplay and ambiguity embedded 
within this metaphor allowed it to be interpreted in two ways: ‘the mayonnaise 
is coalescing … or it is curdling’. More recently, a public service radio 
journalist asked ‘Will the mayonnaise ever bind?’ (Vansevenant 2011), which 
again shows how this metaphor became part of the day-to-day political 
discourse.  
 
Addressing the same ‘end might be nigh’ frame, a ‘landing scenario’ was a 
frequently used transport metaphor. Landing thereby became the end-point of 
a difficult journey, when an agreement between the different communities 
would be reached and a government formed. Despite his party blocking a final 
deal each time, De Wever claimed that ‘[l]ast weekend the compass pointed to 
a landing, for everyone, also for us’ (quoted in De Morgen 2007g – my 
translation), Given the world record duration of the government formation, it 
is not surprising to observe that this metaphor became the object of further 
elaboration and became pervasive in public discourse. In November 2007 a 
negotiator from the Flemish liberal party anonymously posted this message: 
‘We are circling around Brussels, but the landing procedure hasn’t started yet. 
There is still a bit too much turbulence’5. More recently, political scientist Carl 
Devos (2010) wrote: ‘Fasten your seatbelts, and get ready for a difficult 
landing’. But it would still take a year and 9 months before a final agreement 
was made and a new government formed.  
 
Frame 6: Lack of Direction and Leadership 
 
Finally, transport related metaphors also revealed a sense of crisis fatigue 
amongst the population as well as the political and media elites which was 
related to the frame ‘lack of direction and leadership’. ‘Who is behind the 
wheel of the car that drives our nation?’, an editorial asked (Rogiers 2007b). 
However, just as being in the driving seat is seen as being in control and steer 
the process, there is also a need to know where one is heading towards. When 
a new government under leadership of Leterme was finally installed in March 
2008, forced by the market and without a constitutional deal, Caroline 
Gennez, the Dutch-speaking socialist opposition leader, used the metaphor of 
the train to critique the lack of any project of the new government:  
 
The new interim government is as a train that has just been put on the rails; 
the driver and the ticket officers are known, but the direction the train is 
heading to is not. (speaking on VRT-radio, 20/03/2008 – emphasis added 
and my translation), 
 
And this brings us back to the game metaphors. If forming a government is 
not possible, then the main reason for this must be the inexperience of the 
current political elites and the lack of political leadership. A senior political 
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journalist pointed to the fact that most of the Flemish politicians negotiating a 
new Federal government only had experience at the regional level of 
governance. With an ironic note he concluded: ‘they can only just play the 
draughts and now they have to play chess’ (Pauli 2007). 
 
4.2 Interpretative Analysis 
 
The interpretative analysis of metaphors establishes discursive links between 
the source domain and the target domain. The different frames that were 
identified above are used to structure this part of the analysis. The first frame 
related to the immobilism and the blaming game, inherent to the negotiation 
process. The first frame was mostly adopted by journalists, while the second 
one was more dominant amongst politicians. 
 
Table 1: Mapping correspondences between SD and TD in relation to frame 1 
and 2 – Immobilism and attribution of blame 
Elements of the 
Mapping  
SD: Football, Cycling 
and Cards 
TD: The 2007-2008 
Belgian Political Crisis 
Nature of the negotiation Tackles and Slidings Disruptive Tactics, Defensive 
Duration Extra Time Delaying Tactics 
Digging deep into the 
reserves 
Quite some way to go before a 
compromise will be reached 
Lack of progress Standing still on the cycle 
track 
Negotiations stall, nobody moves 
position 
Stalemate No solution, nobody wins 
Close observation Watching each others’ 
wheel 
Who concedes something? 
Attribution of blame The card nobody wants Who is to blame for failing to 
reach an agreement or who 
concedes too much? 
 
As Table 1 points out, the metaphorical use of football served to highlight the 
stresses of the long negotiations, the highly conflictual confrontations and the 
strategy to extend deadlines and buy time in the face of the inability to reach a 
satisfactory agreement that would (temporarily) pacify the conflict. Equally, 
‘surplacen’ symbolised that no progress whatsoever was made and it perfectly 
summarised the political immobility in the period of analysis, but also the 
close reciprocal observation of all actors within a highly mediated 
environment whereby everybody was closely observing everybody to 
determine who moved position and who stayed purer than pure (see Rogiers, 
2007a). 
 
In relation to the black jack metaphor, all too often politicians develop 
strategies to refuse taking responsibility. Blaming ‘the Other’ for the failing of 
negotiations and in doing so positioning themselves beyond any blame, is a 
common tactic to achieve this. In order to be able to do this a process of 
Othering – a strategy of polarisation involving ‘positive ingroup description 
and negative outgroup description’ (van Dijk, 1998: 33) – is essential. This 
works in several directions; blame can be attributed to the adversary or enemy 
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for making inacceptable demands or rejecting so-called reasonable proposals, 
but also within the united front when certain actors reveal a willingness to 
compromise too much according to some actors. 
 
Table 2: Mapping correspondences between SD and TD in relation to frame 3 
– United we Stand 
Elements of the 
Mapping  
SD: War TD: The 2007-2008 
Belgian Political Crisis 
Speaking with one voice The front A strong united front of Flemish 
or Francophone parties 
Irreconcilable The trenches Dug-in entrenched political 
positions 
Mutual taboos that on which no 
compromise is possible 
A Bomb  A radical proposal aimed at 
radicalising the internal cohesion 
of both sides by raising the 
stakes 
Othering Theirs/Ours Construction of essentialist 
political identities 
 
War metaphors further accentuate the difference between ‘Them’ – the 
French-speaking negotiators – having to leave their trenches, and ‘Us’ – the 
Dutch-speaking negotiators – needing to remain steadfast and headstrong, as 
shown in Table 2. The construction of the Other becomes constitutive for the 
construction of the Self, which is why some, following Derrida (1974: 39–44), 
speak of ‘the constitutive outside’ (Staten, 1985: 16-9) or ‘constitutive 
externality’ (Mouffe, 1993: 81), Hence, the necessity to remain united against 
the constructed enemy. The Flemish front and Francophone front refer to the 
strength and unity of each community in juxtaposition to one another.  
 
Indeed, one of the major strengths of war metaphors is their ability to 
accentuate the conflictual and making a solution less probable (Howe, 1988), 
It contributes to the portrayal of any compromise as giving in, as a weakness, 
and as the ultimate form of treason.  
 
Table 3: Mapping correspondences between SD and TD in relation to frame 4 
–Bargaining and Teasing  
Elements of the 
Mapping  
SD: Food/Cooking TD: The 2007-2008 Belgian 
Political Crisis 
Provocation Nibbles The small issues in the negotiating 
process 
Fat Fish The important and most divisive 
issues in the negotiating process  
Patronising Spoonful of Sugar Small concessions to help reaching a 
compromise 
Justification for failure or 
potential of success 
Mayonnaise curdles or 
coalesces 
Reaching agreement is a complex 
matter, it can fail easily due to 
conflicting ingredients 
Everything is coming together, it is 
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quite an effort, but it is happening 
 
Food metaphors were mainly used by political elites to verbally provoke ‘the 
other; as well as to indicate a tongue in cheek willingness to compromise, as 
outlined in Table 3. In this regard, the metaphor of the nibbles or a little 
sweetener to swallow the bitter pill were illustrative. However, what was 
intended as a positive signal to help the negotiations move forward, was 
interpreted by ‘the other’ as insulting, condescending and patronising. This 
also exposes that metaphors can be decoded in different ways by different 
political actors (see Hall, [1973] 1981). 
 
The mayonnaise metaphor also has multiple possible readings embedded in 
itself as it embodies both an explanation for failure - the difficulty of reaching 
a balanced agreement that is acceptable for all and the potential for a 
negotiated positive outcome. Frequent use of this metaphor indicated that a 
compromise was close – the mayonnaise is starting to coalesce, or still far off 
– the mayonnaise is curdling. As good cooks know, making your own 
mayonnaise is not as straightforward as it seems, skill is required and the 
right amount of ingredients are needed. As such, the mayonnaise metaphor 
symbolised the complexity of the negotiations and expresses that a successful 
negotiation process requires several conditions to be met, conflicting 
ingredients mixed and political skill to forge a compromise between different 
political forces, fault lines and ideologies.  
 
Table 4: Mapping correspondences between SD and TD in relation to frame 5 
and 6 – ‘The end might be nigh’ and ‘Lack of direction and leadership’ 
Elements of the 
Mapping  
SD: Transport TD: The 2007-2008 
Belgian Political Crisis 
End-game Landing has started We are near to a reaching a 
compromise 
Issues of leadership and 
statesmanship 
Who is behind the wheel? Lack of authority and the 
inability of the political elites to 
broker a deal 
Sense of direction Where is the train heading 
to? 
There is no project, no vision for 
the future 
 
At several points in the long process of negotiations there were moments 
when it seemed that the end of the tunnel was in sight. Landing was a 
frequently used metaphor by both journalists as politicians in those 
intermediate phases of the negotiation. However, increasingly it became 
apparent that some political actors, mainly the Flemish nationalists, were just 
not ready to make a compromise or in a position to defend a potential 
agreement to their members. Time and time again it became clear that the end 
was not nigh quite yet.  
 
This acutely exposed the lack of leadership and sense of direction of the 
political elites on both sides, unable to overcome divisions that are partly 
shaped by discursive practices, easily amplified by the media and quickly 
engrained in public political discourse. The question of who is driving the car 
and where the country is being taken emerged as powerful discursive 
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metaphors used by journalists as well as politicians in the opposition to 
denote a lack of leadership and having no sense of direction.  
 
4.3 Motivational Analysis 
 
What is of importance at this level of analysis is the pragmatic and strategic 
function of the metaphor. This is bound-up with the intentionality embedded 
in the use of metaphors in political communication; i.e. which intent drives a 
political actor to use certain kinds of metaphors to describe a political 
situation, a mood or an aspiration?  
 
The frequent use of sport-metaphors in political communication is not 
uncommon (Balbus, 1975). Sport-metaphors depict politics as a complex 
game, as ‘a rule-bound contest between two [or more] opponents’ (Howe, 
1988: 89). The struggle for victory, teams pulling together, falling apart, 
competitiveness, and endurance are all elements that politics shares with 
sports, providing a high degree of correspondence. In view of increasing 
recognition, sports that are popular locally are being targeted; in the case of 
Belgium this is football and cycling, which are also prominent source domains 
in Italy (Semino, 2008). The intention in the Belgian context was to denote 
the way the negotiations were developing as a battle of opposing wills or a 
defensive political catenaccio.  
 
However, the imagery of sport or games, especially thought of as bounded by 
rules and rituals, does not conform well all the time to the ‘chaotic and 
unpredictable process of politics’ (Howe, 1988: 94-5). Paraphrasing a quote by 
Raymond Goethals, one of the most successful Belgian football coaches, 
journalist De Vadder (2008) stated that ‘Politics is as football: war’. This 
illustrates how sports metaphors can easily transgress into war metaphors. 
Howe (1988: 95) contends that sport metaphors temper the ‘imagery of 
conflict with the promise of a peaceful resolution’ and this is not always the 
case.  
 
The unpredictability of actors, the at times unwillingness of some actors to 
play by the rules, and the irrationality of politics makes that war metaphors 
are often used in political discourse (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Chilton, 
1987). This can remain rather civilized or even peace-oriented, but can also 
easily lead to a subtle shift from an agonistic disposition to an antagonistic 
one whereby ‘the other’ is constructed as an enemy, rather than a legitimate 
adversary (Mouffe, 1999), Examples of this in the case of the 2007-2011 
Belgian political crisis were: the use of a front to denote the imagined internal 
unity of both sides, as well as a bomb that is placed under the negotiating 
table, implying an act that makes a compromise impossible and thus re-
enforcing resistance on both sides to come to a political solution; better no 
agreement than a bad one.  
 
The need for unity and allegiance to the self is also used to discipline those 
that position other identities – such as political ideology or attempts to 
salvage a sense of Belgianness – over and above a Flemish identity. 
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There are not only cultural and linguistic contradictions between parties, 
there is also a left-right divide. […] That is why forming a Flemish front is so 
tricky. Whenever I want to discuss something internally, it risks leaking to the 
other side (De Wever quoted in Het Laatste Nieuws, 2010 – my translation 
and emphasis added) 
 
The front metaphor is thus also used to attribute blame to those attempting to 
question the internal integrity of the Flemish demands by condemning them 
to collaborate with the enemy – ‘the other side’. There is a long legacy 
amongst Flemish nationalists to cultivate an underdog position and a sense of 
uniqueness and essentialism which makes that it is almost impossible to 
position yourself outside of the nationalist frame; ‘Flemish nationalism is a 
case of muscled, ambitious and normalised nationalism, in the sense that the 
nationalism itself is presented as a normal ingredient of everyday politics’ 
(Blommaert, 1996: 244), impossible to escape from.  
 
Contrary to the sports, games and war metaphors, culinary metaphors are not 
that well documented in the political discourse and metaphors literature, 
although some examples can be found in anthropology and Feminist studies 
(Feldman-Savelsberg, 1994; Kaplan, 2000), Their frequent use in Belgian 
political discourse is not entirely surprising given the bourgondistic nature of 
the Belgians and their love of good food providing instant identification and 
cultural recognition. Food metaphors were especially used by Flemish 
nationalists to patronise the French-speaking negotiators and at the same 
time stress their own pure stance. Minor concessions - a spoonful of sugar – 
should suffice in order to get ‘our’ legitimate demands being met. The nibbles 
– a first package of agreements on minor issues – are fine, but we are hungry 
for a big fish, i.e. major constitutional change towards confederalism. In this 
sense the metaphor becomes the vehicle through which the self-evidence of 
the rightfulness of the Self is being proclaimed; the Self thereby becomes ‘the 
origin of the epistemic true and the deontic right’ (Chilton, 2004: 59). 
 
Culinary metaphors were also used to convey the complex nature of the 
negotiation process, where a number of very sensitive and conflicting issues 
need to be balanced and reconciled. The mayonnaise metaphor allowed 
political elites to connect to the ever more astonished general public and 
ultimately to the electorate, explaining why it suddenly had become 
impossible to compromise and negotiate a fair deal as has always been the 
case at other moments of institutional crisis in Belgium’s history. At the same 
time, the mayonnaise metaphor was polysemic, also expressing an opening 
towards closure and success, as the mayonnaise can potentially start 
coalescing at any point.  
 
This duality also transgresses into the transport metaphors, which are often 
denoted as metaphors of movement, direction or journey in the literature 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 179) identify the primary metaphor: ‘purposeful 
activities are journeys’ which lead to a destination and imply the movement of 
objects and encountering obstacles. Charteris-Black (2004: 93) furthermore 
exposes how journey metaphors point to desirability destinations, i.e. policy 
outcomes.  
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Whereas the landing metaphor echoes the positive intention of the curdling 
process – the coming together of all the pieces, arriving at ones destinations, 
other transport metaphors voice a concern that resonates more with a 
pessimistic frame, emphasising a lack of sense of direction, too much focus on 
the institutional and no vision for the future beyond that. Along the same 
lines, a lack of leadership to pull everybody together and piece together a 




As shown throughout this analysis, the use of metaphors in political 
communication is part of a discursive strategy that is highly ideological, 
historically and cognitively embedded and amplified through mediation. 
Metaphors are vehicles of overt and hidden meanings, used by political and 
media actors as a discursive practice with a precise strategic aim and intent in 
mind; this can be to critique the ‘inexperienced’ political elite in the case of 
journalists or to discipline allies and humiliate ‘the other’ in the case of 
political elites. Especially nationalistic actors were very prolific in the 
production of political metaphors and in taking advantage of their particular 
properties. This refers foremost to the ability of metaphors to shape public 
discourse, to speak to particular frames and to present political ‘reality’ in a 
specific way, hegemonizing a divisive agenda, and constructing clear 
boundaries between us and them, between the interests of the Self and those 
of the Other.  
 
However, metaphors also prove to be flexible in their use. The versatility and 
language of imagination inherent to a metaphor makes that it can be decoded 
or even recoded differently. Once they become pervasive in the public and 
media discourse, the meaning of a metaphor can be challenged, ridiculed and 
even perverted (Mio, 1997: 129). It could be argued that the frequent use of 
(some) metaphors by political and media elites resulted in more division 
rather than convergence of positions. Metaphors indicating a move towards 
seeking solutions and a willingness to compromise were less prominent than 
those that symbolised gridlock or internal as well as external conflicts and 
tensions. At the same time, some metaphors precisely referred to the inability 
of political elites to overcome the crisis or to the lack of a coherent vision for 
the future and leadership. Others were intentionally used to belittle political 
opponents and make a solution less probable. 
 
Many of the metaphors expose a public discourse that is politically entrenched 
in a nationalistic agenda that positions compromise as treason, hence the 
need for a united front and being steadfast. The sports, games and war 
metaphors used by politicians contributed to the process of Othering and to a 
polarisation between essentialist representations of the Flemings (the Self) as 
reasonable, willing to compromise and of the Walloons (the Other) as 
unreasonable, unwilling to give in to the legitimate nationalistic demands of 
the Flemings – part of the ‘perpetual defensive attitude vis-à-vis others, and 
this in turn warrants aggressive nationalist policies’ (Blommaert, 1996: 245 – 
emphasis added). To quote journalist Desmet (2007 – my translation):  
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Flemish negotiators who do not move an inch are given the praising 
description that ‘they kept their ground’, while French-speaking negotiators 
who do exactly the same, receive the epitheton ‘obstinate’.  
 
It is not being argued here that the use of metaphors are inherently bad or 
should be avoided in political communication, but that we must be weary if 
the power of metaphors in representing ideology as common sense is being 
used in processes of Othering (Van Dijk, 1998), geared towards exacerbating 
political conflict rather than seeking democratic solutions to them. Words and 
discourses do matter and that is why the political intentions behind the use of 
particular metaphors need to be exposed for what they are, not common 
wisdom and self-evident, but rather ideological vehicles advancing one 
particular view of the world whilst delegitimizing others. As Lakoff (2008: 34) 
points out it is our duty as social scientists and as citizens to ‘make the 
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Notes: 
                                            
1 Constitutional changes to the structure of Belgium have tended to occur every 10 years since 
the 1960s and include: Egmont Pact (1970), Second Institutional Reform (1980), Third 
Institutional Reform (1988-89), Sint-Michiels and Sint-Kwintens accords (1993-94), 
Lambermont- and Lombard accords (2001). 
2 There are, however, notable exceptions to this. For example, the French-speaking public 
broadcaster RTBf used to have for many years a weekly feature in the news about Flanders. 
One of the main political journalists of the RTBf had at some point a blog on the site of the 
Dutch-speaking public broadcaster VRT. Furthermore, in the run-up and during the 2010 
campaign in Belgium both public broadcasters did some efforts to show ‘the other side’, but 
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plans to organise a joint debate had to be abandoned as RTBf was not prepared to provide a 
platform to the post-fascist party Vlaams Belang.  
3 For reasons of space, religious metaphors, common proverbs and nicknames were excluded. 
4 See: http://twitter.com/#!/MarcLooverbosch/status/37638306292305921  
5 See: http://forum.fok.nl/topic/1097804/2/25  
